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Better Sixty Years of Tyranny Than One
Night of Anarchy
NOAH FELDMAN
I'm really honored to be invited by you and by the rest of the
International  Law Review, and  excited to be with  all of you here
today. It's very, very daunting to appear to speak after you've just
heard  your  teachers,  your  senior  colleagues,  your  elders  and
betters in every respect, speak on the topic. So I'm going to try to
make  my  remarks  in  some  way  a  bridge  between  the  morning
panel  and the afternoon  panels.  I will  try to talk a little bit about
realities  in  Iraq  and  how  they've  developed;  to  talk  a  little  bit
about some philosophical  ideas, and how they might be connected
to that.  I  even  want  to  suggest  that  some  of our  problems  that
we've  faced  in  Iraq  so  far  are  actually  the  product  of  a
philosophical  view held, all unknowingly,  by members  of the U.S.
government  in the run-up  to our difficulties in Iraq. Apologies to
all in advance if I fall down on the job in any of these regards.
I'm going to  start with an Arabic adage that can be found  at
least  in  the  Middle  Ages.  You  can  find  it  in  the  writing  of Ibn
Taymiyya, but it's pretty clear that he's already quoting something
much older. And this phrase goes  like this:  "Better  sixty years  of
tyranny  than one night of anarchy."  It's a strong formulation, and
it's usually  quoted by Western  writers speaking  about the Islamic
political tradition to emphasize the claim, which I think is not quite
right, that the Muslim political tradition wasn't that worried about
how bad tyranny was. I think that's exactly backwards, and I think
we  see  this much  more clearly  after what we've gone  through  in
Iraq.  I think the  point  of the phrase  is  to  tell  you just how  bad
anarchy actually  is. The suggestion is that even one night-and it's
significant that in at least some versions of the adage it's the nights,
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when there's  no one in charge-even  one night  of the removal of
authority  can bring about the utter destruction of political  society
as we know it. It's that adage that I want to take as my inspiration
for my comments  today. Not  that I  want to  suggest  to you that I
agree with it; just that it's an interesting basis for reflection on the
thoughts that I'm going to discuss.
That  night  of  anarchy,  or  rather  that  several  weeks  of
anarchy, actually came to Iraq in  2003. It came in the wake  of the
U.S. bombing  and the U.S. march on Baghdad  that had the effect
of toppling  Saddam's  government before  there  were enough U.S.
troops on the ground to exert effective  control over the city. This
happened  to  a  lesser  degree  elsewhere  in  the  country.  Indeed,
even  had  the  United  States  wanted  to  pretend-and  I  think  it
could  have  pretended  that  it  had  enough  troops  to  control  the
city-it  didn't  try.  The  extraordinary  degree  of  looting  that
resulted  was  disastrous  on  two  levels.  It  was  disastrous  at  the
practical  level;  the  utter  destruction  of  almost  every  major
government  structure in the country.  I was struck when Professor
Waldron'  was quoting the passage in O'Donovan's book about the
destruction of the Ministry of Justice. Ambassador Istrabadi2 and I
know that although  the  Ministry  of Justice  wasn't  untouched  by
the  attacks,  it  was  never  directly  bombed.  The  image  that
O'Donovan  is  talking  about  is  actually  of  what  the  Ministry  of
Justice looked like after it had been looted. After the looters were
finished  with  the  Ministry  of  Justice-which  took  a  couple  of
hours-there was not a document left in the building; not a stick of
furniture  left  in  the  building.  Anything  that  wasn't  of  use  was
thrown into  the courtyard  in the  center  of the building  from the
top ten stories  and burned there. Nothing effectively remaining  of
the  building. Of  course,  most important,  the  human  capital,  the
employees were gone, and they were never coming back. This was
practically disastrous I said. That was the first problem.
The  second  problem-and  in  some  ways  even  worse
problem-was  that  the occupying  forces  sent the  message  to the
people  of  Baghdad,  and  by  extension  the  people  of  the  whole
1.  Professor Jeremy Waldron,  University Professor, New York University  School of
Law, was  a panelist  on Panel One, "Moral Obligations  of an Occupier  to the Occupied."
Symposium,  Transformation in Iraq: From Ending a Modern War to Creating a Modern
Peace,  31  LOY. L.A. INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. < > (< >).
2.  Ambassador  Feisal  Amin  Rasoul  Istrabadi  served  as  Iraq's  Ambassador  and
Deputy Permanent Representative  to the United Nations from 2004 to 2007. Ambassador
Istrabadi  was a panelist on Panel Three, "Practical  Realities: Exiting Iraq." Id.
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country, that nobody was in charge. We announced anarchy. Hard
to pull that off actually in the world, but we did it. Iraqis  were for
the  most  part,  those  in  Baghdad,  stunned  by  this.  Many  people
said  to  me...  one  old  man  in  particular  who  remembered  the
coups  which  were  frequent  in  the  1950s  and  1960s-the  60s  in
particular-said  to  me,  "You  know  everyone  is  a little  mystified.
We  remember  that when there's a coup, someone  appears  on the
radio  and says,  'My name is General so-and-so and I'm in charge.
Do not leave your homes  or you will be shot.'  And then  a couple
of days  later the  same  voice  would come  on-probably  the same
voice-and  say,  'I'm  still  General  so-and-so,  go  back  to  work or
you'll  be  shot."'  And  he  said, "That  was  sort  of the way  we  did
things and nobody's telling us who's in charge  at all. There's been
no  effort  to  communicate  any  sense  of who's  in  charge."  Now
allowing  a little  bit for the  heat  of the  moment  I think there's  a
deep  observation  there,  which  is  that  the  failure  to  even  assert
authority  announces  to  ordinary  people  that  in  fact  nobody's  in
charge.
So that's the first framing moment, and now I want to turn to
the situation as it stands. The situation is that, formally, as a matter
of international law, the United States is no longer the occupier of
Iraq. There  was  a lot of discussion  in this  morning's panel  about
the United States  as an occupying  force, and I think as a matter of
fact that remains  true.  As a matter of fact there's still upwards of
one  hundred  fifty  thousand  U.S.  troops  on  the  ground,  and the
Prime Minister is limited to some degree in what he can do by the
presence  of the  United  States.  Many  other  things  limit  him  too,
which I'll be  talking about, but legally speaking the United  States
is  not  the  occupier.  Legally  speaking  there  is  a  sovereign  Iraqi
government. And it's the position of the U.S. government-true  or
false  is  a  separate  question-but  it's  the  position  of  the  U.S.
government that if the elected Iraqi government  asked the United
States  to  leave,  that  we  would leave.  And  as  things  have  gotten
worse  and worse  in  Iraq, I've  occasionally  thought  that the  U.S.
government  is  sort  of hoping  that the Iraqi  government  will  say,
"please  leave."  Because  that  would  be  the  one  way  to justify
withdrawal.  The  truth  is  that  the  Iraqi  political  institutions  that
exist, and they're  vexed in many ways, are in some important way
representative  of the Iraqi  people.  They've been  elected, not just
through  one,  but  through  a  series  of  elections.  One  ratified  a
constitutional  structure. The group of people who put forward that
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constitutional  structure  were  themselves  elected  in  a  national
referendum.  Then  there  was further  national  election  under  the
terms  of  the  constitution.  So  there  have  already  been  several
important electoral  events in Iraq. The  government does in  some
sense  speak  on  behalf  of  some  entity  that  could  be  labeled  the
Iraqi people.
And yet-and here's what's so interesting about this-despite
the  de facto occupation  and the existence of an Iraqi government
that  asserts  sovereign  authority, there  exists  across  the  country  a
range  of  militias  on  a  range  of different  sides,  who  themselves
exercise  tremendous  power  and  effect  in  the  country  based  on
their ability to use force. We've just seen this in the last ten days in
the southern city of Basra where the government sought to fight a
military  action  against  one  of the  most  powerful  militias  in  the
country, the Jaish al-Mahdi,  the Mahdi Army, which  is associated
with Muqtada  al-Sadr. The government  then. had to sue for peace,
essentially with Sadr, and it negotiated a peace.
So  if in April  2003  the problem  in Iraq  was  that  there  was
nobody in charge,  today the problem is there are too many people
who  could  arguably  be  in  charge.  The  United  States  could
arguably  be  described  as  in  charge,  the  Iraqi  government  could
arguably be described  as in charge,  and the militias in some sense
could  arguably  be  described  as in  charge.  Now whether  that's  a
question  of anarchy or not is a question I'm going to  turn to in a
moment.  But I  want  now  to turn  to  a little  bit  of philosophical
discussion  to try  to make sense  of these  two  different  situations,
and then I'll come back to practical realities in Iraq, and conclude
by  actually  addressing  the  question  of  how  withdrawal  can  or
might  begin  to  give  way  to  some  sort  of  organized  political
authority in Iraq  that improves  upon the  situation  that  presently
exists.
When I went off to Iraq, I, like a lot of Americans -especially
American  lawyers,.  but  probably  Americans  generally-was
deeply,  if  in  some  ways  unconsciously,  influenced  by  a
philosophical  picture  of  how  governments  come  into  existence
associated  with  the  philosopher  John  Locke.  The  reason  that
Locke  is  so  influential  in  the United  States  is  that the  Founding
Fathers  of the  United  States  found  Locke  to  be  an  enormously
useful  philosopher  for  them-almost  unimaginably  useful.  Now
why was he so useful?  Why-did it seem to them that he had almost
been created  for them?  Because  he  offered,  among  other things,
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an  account  of how people-there  are  many  reasons  that  he  was
useful but this is just one version-he offered,  among other things,
an  account  of how people  might justifiably  break  their bonds  of
relationship to one  sovereign, then come together  by consent  and
form  themselves  through  contract  into  a  new  sovereign  power.
Oddly enough, that's just what they were going to do themselves.  I
think  they might  have  done it  even absent  John Locke,  but they
treated Locke's work as though it were a kind of handbook.
Now  this is  a  troubling thing for contemporary  philosophers
who  study  Locke,  because  although  the  Founding  Fathers  were
deeply intrigued  by the idea of "the state of nature,"-not an idea
that Locke  invented,  but an idea  that Locke used very effectively
in  his  account  of  how  you  can  do  these  things-contemporary
philosophers reading Locke closely make the fair, and I think true
observation,  that in Locke's  view it's not necessary  for the  "state
of nature" ever to have existed. In fact, Locke is using the "state of
nature"  as a kind of teaching tool; a kind of hypothetical example,
you  might  say.  When  we  law  professors  dream  up  these
hypotheticals  for  a  living,  we  don't  actually  think  they've
happened.  If they had happened,  if we thought  they'd  happened,
they  Wouldn't  be  hypotheticals.  Locke  dreamt  up  this  "state  of
nature,"  or other philosophers before him dreamt up this "state  of
nature,"  in  order  to  make  an  argument  about  what  justifies  or
legitimates  political  authority.  And  though  he  did  say  when
pressed himself in his own works that the  "state  of nature"  really
had  existed,  contemporary  philosophers  tend  to  raise  their
eyebrows  at that formulation. They  say, "Oh  come  on. He didn't
really mean that it had really existed."  And yet it was precisely the
existence  of this  idea  of a "state  of nature"  where you  dissolved
one  government,  enter  into  the  "state  of nature"  and then  were
free to form a new one that so appealed to the Founding Fathers.
o  So what? Who cares about this little excursion into the history
of  the Founding Fathers?  Well the reason  that it mattered  in the
real  world  in  Iraq  is  that  we  Americans  are  so  influenced  even
subconsciously  by this story, this philosophical  story, because of its
connection  to  our  own  constitutional  history.  When  we  thought
about  what  a  constitutional  process  might  look like  in  Iraq,  our
imaginings  went  something  like  this:  (1)  conquer  a country;  and
(2) get rid of the very bad man in charge of the country. And once
he's  gone,  what  happens?  Well, people  go  back  to  the  "state  of
nature."  And what happens when they're in the "state of nature"?
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They all sit down together nicely. They realize that it's in their self
interest to  form  themselves  into  an  effective  polity  that  respects
rights, because otherwise  they would be in a bad situation. And so
they ought to be  allowed to  form a new government  more or less
spontaneously.
You're  laughing because  this sounds absurd, but Ambassador
Istrabadi  and I were  both at a meeting in the very end of April of
2003  in  which  the  representatives  of  the  U.S.  government  got
together what they thought was a collection of Iraqi notables. They
were  an  odd  group  of  people  in  that  some  people  were  well
represented,  others  were  overrepresented,,  others
underrepresented,  but  nevertheless  it  was  a  group  of  people  of
influence  in the country. And they were told by American  officials
present,  "We're  just  doing  reconstruction;  you're  in  charge  of
government."  And  this  meeting,  which  was  incomprehensible  I
think to most of the Iraqis present, would have been unimaginable
absent this kind of background  idea of what  Locke stands for. So,
when  I say Lockean, I  don't mean necessarily  Locke's own views.
I'm  talking  now  about  an  idea  sort  of  associated  with  the
philosopher John Locke.
Now this was a terrible idea, I think it's fair to say. And notice
in passing, just a foreshadow of this afternoon's panels, that from a
legal  standpoint,  from  an  international  law  standpoint,  it  also
didn't really have  a  basis in  at least presently  existing  notions  of
the law of occupation. There  are  those who  try to  argue that you
could  imagine  that after  the  destruction  of an  existing  state, the
state  could  utterly  cease  to  exist  and then  be  reconstructed  from
scratch;  but  even  that.is  a  tendentious  and  minority  position  in
international  law.  The  standard  view  is  that  someone  has
sovereignty  at  all  times.  Once  the  conqueror  has  removed
sovereignty  from  the  existing  ruler,  the  conqueror  has  at  least
some  sort  of  temporary  sovereignty-you  might  call  it
trusteeship-and  has  certain responsibilities  that  come with  that.
Now  this. is  made  more  complicated  by  the  idea  of  popular
sovereignty,  because  if it's the Iraqi people who  have  sovereignty
then you have to tell the story a little differently. Then you say the
Iraqi people  were always  sovereign, and the United  States simply
came  to  remove  one  government,  never  touching  Iraqi
sovereignty.  This would be one version of the story. And then, the
United  States is  simply  assisting the Iraqis  in reestablishing  their
own sovereignty. Sovereignty is always a fiction but that takes it to
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a fictional  level  that's really  difficult  to  sustain.  So  I think that's
probably not the most useful way of thinking about it. But the key
point I want to make  is that international  law  does not  have  the
view  that  was  the  view  that  was  broadly  imagined  by  the  U.S.
government.  And  I  will  add  as  well  that  most  of  the  relevant
officials  in  the  U.S.  government  were  wholly  ignorant  of. what
international  law  even  said  about  the  topic.  And  at  no  point
subsequently have they tried to educate themselves on this.
This  odd Lockean  picture,  which  I  myself also  shared, could
be  supplemented  by  comparison  to  another  important
philosophical  figure,  a  precursor  of  Locke's.  And  that's  the
philosopher  Thomas  Hobbes.  Now  Hobbes  is  one  of  the  most
vexed topics  that you could  imagine in political theory because  on
a certain level  his views  look rather similar to Locke's, and Locke
was  in  certain  ways  indebted  to  him.  In  other  ways  they  look
radically  different  from  Locke's,  utterly  different  from  Locke's.
The  big  difference  between  the  two  almost  always  rests  in  their
conclusions  rather  than  the  way  they  reason  to  the  conclusions.
That's  a  crude  characterization  but  it'll  have  to  stand  for  the
moment.  Hobbes'  perspective  on  this  question  is  one  that
Professor  Waldron  alluded  to  this  morning,  and  which  indirectly
Professor Coleman3 also alluded to, and I just want to talk about it
for just a moment. First I want to talk about Hobbes'  view on the
difference  between war and peace. Because as Professor Coleman
mentioned  this  morning,  a very  important  desideratum  for us  in
having  all  the conversations  we're  having is  to figure  out what  is
war and what  is peace. Hobbes had a very distinctive definition  of
both. In the case of war he said, "War is the state that exists when
there is no effective sovereign."  And to him an effective  sovereign
was  an  absolute  sovereign. A  sovereign who  was  wholly  obeyed.
Or who would be able to punish those who failed to obey. And he
said  that insofar  as there  was  no effective  sovereign,  you were at
war. That was his definition of war. He added that you didn't have
to  have  actual fighting  to  be  at war. War is  a time  continuum  in
which  people  are  inclined  to  go  to  battle  to  resolve  their
difficulties.  He  actually-this  is  sort  of  humorous  but  he  was
English so it makes some sense-he says that it's like bad weather.
War is like bad weather. When you say we're  having bad weather,
3.  Professor Jules  Coleman,  Wesley Newcomb  Hohfeld  Professor of Jurisprudence
and  Professor  of Philosophy,  Yale  Law  School,  was  a  panelist  on  Panel  One,  "Moral
Obligations of an Occupier to Occupied."  Id.
2009]Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
you don't just mean that right this moment it's raining. (This is the
worst analogy imaginable  in Los Angeles,  I  realize  now. As  I say
this  and  look  out  the  window.  So  you  may  not  know  what  I'm
talking about now. There's this thing called bad weather.)  And he
says when we  say we're having bad weather, what we mean is  that
we're having bad weather over the course of several  days; not that
it's raining all the time. And similarly, he says war does not mean
that  you're  constantly  fighting  at  every  moment;  it  means  that
you're  in a  state where  the inclination  to  fight remains  there. So
that's his definition  of war. And then he's got a punch line where
he says,  "Any other state is peace."  So peace  is anything that's not
war. This would not satisfy Professor Coleman's call to us to have
a more nuanced and complex vision of what counts as peace.
The reason I think that Hobbes offers  this vision is that-and
it's associated  as you  all know  With  his very bleak  vision  of what
human nature is like-his idea that if you leave people without any
absolute sovereign, what they will do is go to war with each other.
What they will do  is struggle with each other. What they will do is
try to gain advantage  or eminence  over one another. That they will
never stop doing this until some  sovereign stops them from  doing
so. He wants  us to accept that we need the sovereign, and in effect,
he's  saying  when  you have  that sovereign  in  place,  that's peace.
You cannot  even  have  peace  until  you have  this  sovereign  with
absolute  authority.  He furthermore  thinks that the  only way  you
can  talk  about  justice  is  when  you  have  a  sovereign  in  place
already. When people  are fighting each other in this way,  as they
do in a state of war, he says it's not even meaningful  to talk about
the relationship  between just and  unjust, what's mine  and  what's
yours; the stuff that we do in law school all the time. He says that's
not  meaningful  absent  a  state.  And  what  is  a state?  A  state  is  a
functioning  sovereign of absolute power who can stop people from
killing each other.
Now you can probably see where this is going, and this is why
Hobbes  is  less  popular,  and  was  certainly  not  popular  to  our
Founding Fathers. In Hobbes'  view this justified a picture in which
the sovereign had essentially absolute authority over everything in
the  society.  You  think  you  have  a  right  to  free  speech?  Not
according  to  Hobbes.  The  sovereign  has  the  absolute  right  to
control  opinion,  because  opinion  could  be  harmful  to  absolute
power and control. But notice that part of what's driving Hobbes'
view  is  this deep  fear of what happens  when  order breaks  down.
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That is in some way resonant with the medieval Muslim adage that
I mentioned to you before. And on the question of whether there
was ever such a state of war of all against all, Hobbes is even more
equivocal  than Locke. He  says,  "I don't even  claim that this ever
existed universally  in  the  past."  But he  says-and I  think this  is
very telling-"you  can  see what  I'm talking about  from  cases  of
civil war."  He says,  "you can see what I'm talking about when you
have  a  state,  an absolute  all  powerful state."  Note  from  me:  like
Iraq,  where  in  fact  Saddam  was  an  absolutist  ruler.  Where  he
limited  all  forms  of  free  expression.  Where  you .couldn't  do
anything without his authority. Under those circumstances Hobbes
says when that breaks down  and you have  civil war, then he  says.
you'll see what I'm talking about when I talk about the war of all
against all.
Now  again  like  most  Americans,  I  didn't  think  that  this
picture corresponded very closely to the real world as I was likely
to  encounter  it  before  I  went  to  Iraq.  Now  I  think  somewhat
differently.  Now  certainly,  and  heaven  forbid  that  it  should  be
otherwise,  I  don't  accept  Hobbes'  conclusions  about  the
justifiability  of  absolutism.  But  there  is  one  feature  of  Hobbes'
argument that I'm at least, more  sympathetic  to now  than  I ever
imagined that I could  be, and I'm going to mention that and then
I'm going to turn to the question of how we could actually get out
of Iraq  functionally.  And it's  this:  it's  Hobbes'  idea  that absent
some functioning state, you cannot really imagine the construction
or the effective functioning  of society. Absent  a state  where some
entity  is  in  charge-and  let's  call  it  a  just  constitutional
government rather than an absolutist monarch--absent somebody
in  charge,  the  conditions  for  the  structuring  of  a  functioning
society  are  all but  impossible  to  maintain  and to  achieve.  And I
mean  this  in  very  practical  terms.  What  I  mean  is  that  at  the
moment,  in  2003  when  the  United  States  effectively  projected
anarchy  over  Iraq,  it  raised  the  degree  of  difficulty  of  the
subsequent construction  by Iraqis of a functioning  state to a point
that makes  it almost unimaginable  that they  or any other people
could successfully  accomplish it. We made it so difficult for people
to  reconstruct  themselves  into  functioning  politics  because  we
allowed that moment when nobody was in charge.
Now compare  a scenario where  we had insisted, for example,
that  we  were  in  charge.  We  could  have  done  this,  by  the  way,
wholly  unjustly  or  wholly  justly  according  to  Hobbes.  This  is
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another  point  that  grows  out  of  Professor  Waldron's  comments
this morning. Professor Waldron urged us to look at the difference
between Locke and Hobbes'  views on the question of government
by conquest.  Now Locke-the nice  good appealing  Locke  whom
we  all love-says  that if you've  had  a conquest unjustly,  you can
never have legitimate  authority. If it's born  in sin, forget about it.
If you conquer  unjustly you're  just like  a pirate. And it's  not  as
though  over  time  the  pirate's  rule  is  somehow  going to  become
legitimate.  It's  always  going  to  be  unjust.  Hobbes  says  no  such
thing. From  his view  that  there  has  to  be  an  absolute  sovereign,
and  that you  can't  have  conditions  which  count  as justice  in the
absence  of that sovereign, he thinks that it doesn't matter whether
the  person  who  conquers  does  so justly  or  unjustly,  has  a  good
cause  or  doesn't  have  a  good  cause.  Once  that  sovereign  is  in
charge,  he's  just  as  authorized  to  rule  over  you  as  would  be  a
wholly just government. That's a remarkable thing for him to say.
Again,  it  seems  intuitively,  terribly  unappealing.  But  just
imagine  for  a  moment  a  scenario.  Assume  for  the  sake  of
argument that  we  invaded  Iraq  unjustly.  Nevertheless  you could
imagine  that if we had announced that we were actually  in charge;
if  we  had  projected  power  and  said  that  we  were  effectively  in
charge,  and  then  had  said and  we  intend  not  to be  in charge  at
some relatively soon  future  date,  then Iraqis  who  recognized  the
reality  of our  political  authority-not  its  justice  but  its  reality-
might  have  had  the  inclination  to  begin  immediately  trying  to
develop the kinds  of political institutions  that would enable  them
to govern themselves  effectively once we were no longer in charge.
Now  that  would  not  have  been  true  of  everybody.  It  certainly
would  not  have  been  true  of  people  who  were  so  deeply
committed  to  the  thought  that  injustice  can  never  justify
government, that they were inclined to go to war against us.
But  what  I  want  to  suggest  to  you here - and this  is  not  a
philosophical  point,  but  a  practical  one-is  that  I  think  there
would  have  been  many  fewer  Iraqis  who  would  have  taken  up
arms against the United States on purely principled grounds under
those  circumstances,  though  they  might  have  been  justified  in
doing it, than  actually did take arms  up against us when they got
the  message  that  we  weren't  actually  capable  or  interested  in
limiting  them  from  doing  so.  As  it  was,  it  took  the  insurgency
months to develop.  My  view  as to why  is that  ordinary people  in
Iraq-even those who hated us and were sure that our coming was
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unlawful  and  illegitimate-thought  we  probably  were  going  to
manage  to  take  control.  They  were  shocked  by  our  inability  to
control things, shocked  by the looting, but they said, oh come  on,
these guys will pull it together somehow, they're the United States
of  America.  And  it  was  when  we  didn't-when  we  essentially
opened the door to competing centers of political authority or let's
say military  authority or  guns, people  with guns  on the  streets-
that they stepped up and took advantage.  So ironically, it was our
tenderness  of mind and  heart, our  desire not to declare ourselves
to be absolutely in charge-although  eventually the United States
did  identify itself  as  an occupier  under international  law-it  was
our desire to insist that we were in fact not in charge of politics in
the country  that opened the door to the anarchic  situation, which
opened the  possibility  of new centers of military  power emerging
in the country, namely the militias.
With  that  I  now  want  to  turn  to  the  present  situation  and
what,  if  anything,  this  philosophical  background  might  suggest
about how  we get out of it. I said  a few minutes  ago that if at the
beginning, the difficulty is that nobody was in charge, that now the
problem is that there are too many competing centers of authority
in Iraq.  Three  by my  count.  More  if you count  each  militia  as  a
separate one, then it could be dozens. The question that faces Iraq
now is,  as the United States presence  gradually declines-which  I
think after the next presidential  election it's likely to, regardless of
who's  elected-can  Iraq  transform  the hodgepodge  system  of de
facto government that exists across the country into something that
looks more like a  single  functioning  government?  It has  two  twin
challenges  there.  The  first  is,  as  the  United  States withdraws  its
force  and  becomes  less  of  a  power  in  the  country,  can  the
government  fill  in  where  the  United  States  is  withdrawing?
Everyone  agrees that that's a necessity, an absolutely necessity  of
successful reconstruction in Iraq. Everyone agrees that it should be
a  high  priority  for  the  United  States.  And  I  think  most  people
agree ...  maybe I'm wrong about this, but I think that most people
agree  that it's not happening  so far. I think that what's happened
in the last  couple weeks in Basra suggests that is still the case.  By
that I  simply mean that  the Iraqi  military  and security forces  are
still not anywhere near at the level of strength they would need  to
be to actually exert a monopoly  of legitimate force  in the country.
If they can't  decisively  beat  the  Mahdi  Army  on  their own, then
they can't govern the country. That's a serious and major challenge
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and  I simply  want to point to that. It shows you that the de facto
occupation  that the United States is engaged  in actually has some
benefits  for  the  local  government.  Because  to  the  extent  that
government claims to be sovereign and is to tell people what to do,
it's only able  to do it because the United States is behind it. That's
an  irony  and  a  difficulty  that  is  going to  mark  any  question  of
United  States  withdrawal  and  the  transfer  of legitimate  de facto
authority to the Iraqi government.
The second is that where the  Iraqi  government chooses  as  a
practical  matter  to  share  power  with  non-governmental  players,
and there's  a mixed and complex  shared power, the challenge  for
the  new  Iraqi  government  going  forward  will  be  for  those
structures  to  acknowledge  formally  that  they  belong  under  the
aegis of the Iraqi government. Now whether they'll do that or not
is an open question. I'm not here to tell you that they will or they
won't,  but  I  am  here  to  say  that  that  is  the  most  important
challenge  from  the  standpoint  of the  Iraqi  government.  Forget
about  eliminating  those  local  players  as  actual  power  centers.
We're  stuck with that now.  We're stuck with that for at least  the
next five or ten years. What I'm saying is in the best case scenario,
those  local  players,  the  local  militias,  local  sheiks,  who  have
control  over  a  certain  number  of  men  at  arms,  they  have  to
acknowledge themselves  as part of the Iraqi governing structure  so
that it can fairly be said that the government  is in charge  and that
they're not in charge.
Now oddly, that process  whereby they have to enter into this
kind of agreement looks strangely Lockean. It looks strangely like
the  process  of  people  agreeing  relatively  calmly  to  enter  into
circumstances  where  they will  consider themselves  part of a new
government.  But  what  I want  to suggest-and  this  is  my  punch
line-is that there is no way for that negotiated process to happen
absent a power in the country militarily capable of limiting them. I
want to  suggest  that there  has  to be  a centralized power  coming
from  the  state,  a  military  power  from  the  state,  capable  of
subduing them in order for them actually to have the freedom, as it
were-although  I  mean  that  ironically-to  enter  into  an
agreement to be governed by part of the central government.
Let  me just explain  what  I  mean  and  then  I'll be  quiet  and
open it up for questions. Consider what just happened in Basra. To
the extent that the Mahdi Army  showed that it could hold  off the
central  government,  the  deal  that  it  strikes  with  the  central
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government for how Basra will actually be governed is not going to
be conducive  to its entrance  into  a national government,  because
it's based on the Mahdi Army's ability to use military force against
the  government.  So  even  if  they  say,  "Oh  we're  part  of  the
government,"  they won't really  be. They'll be  much  like Hobbes'
state  of war. They will  be in  the  time  continuum  of battle. They
will be inclined  towards battle whenever it's called for. For it to be
the  case  that  they  were  actually  entering  into  a  central
government,  I  believe  the government  would have  to  be  able  to
beat them-wouldn't have to actually beat them; it would have  to
make a credible case that it could beat them. And  we're certainly
not there yet. The question of whether  Iraq will  turn into a place
where  a Hobbesian civil war  will continue, or a place where  some
sort  of  Lockean  consensus  will  build  itself  into  a  functioning
government,  is  going  to  depend  ultimately  on  the  question  of
whether  the  central  government  is  able,  on  its  own  and  with
American  help, to generate the kinds of security forces that could
actually  control  the  country.  I  think  that's  actually  the  baseline
necessity without which we will not have success in Iraq.
And so on the key questions-what do we owe Iraq and when
should  we  leave?-I'll  just  give  you  one  line  answers  to  both.
United States  owes  to Iraq to leave  Iraq in a state  wherein Iraqis
are capable  of effective  self-government.  When should we  leave?
The answer is, we should leave  as soon as it is either clear that the
Iraqi government is able effectively to govern, or it is clear that the
Iraqi government will never be able to govern. That last scenario is
a  scary  one.  It worries  me  deeply.  I don't want  to  say, however,
that  it  would  never  come  into  existence.  You  could  imagine  a
scenario where  all has been tried and it can't happen  and that we
therefore have  to leave. I think we'll know the answer to that last
question  if, and when the Iraqi public  tells the United States now
it's time to go. The Iraqi political institutions are not yet capable of
self-government  in  a  true  and  effective  way,  but  what  they  are
capable of is expressing the preferences and the desires of the Iraqi
people. They're actually  pretty good  at that. At that moment  the
Iraqi government  says it's time to go then we'll have to. Thank you
for listening, and I'm eager to hear questions and challenges.
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